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COMMENT: EMINENT DOMAIN:
THE SOLUTION TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS OR
OVERSTEPPING GOVERNMENT BOUNDARIES?
By:  Anne T. T. Jensen*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2012, the relatively unknown county of San
Bernardino, California made national headlines when its CEO an-
nounced that he would entertain a venture fund’s proposal to use the
county’s power of eminent domain to seize mortgages and sell them for
restructuring in an effort to assist the county’s struggling homeown-
ers.  While many, including California Lieutenant Governor Gavin
Newsom, backed the county’s resourcefulness in desperate times,1
others have questioned whether the county could be overstepping its
constitutional bounds and causing more harm than good.  Is this the
long-awaited solution to America’s floundering housing market?
Unfortunately, it seems a revival of the market through emi-
nent domain is unlikely.  While the San Bernardino proposal would be
within the limits of the power afforded to states and municipalities by
the U.S. and state constitutions, it may have a long-term cooling effect
on the lending market that would greatly outweigh any short-term re-
lief it may offer.
This article will provide both an analysis of the legal concept of
eminent domain and its likelihood of success in resuscitating real es-
tate markets in towns like San Bernandino. Sections Two and Three
will explore the background of the mortgage crisis and provide an in-
depth description of the eminent domain proposal by the Mortgage
Resolution Partners (“MRP”). Section Four takes a deeper look into the
state and federal precedent on a municipality’s power to use eminent
domain, revealing that the definition of “legitimate public purpose”
would likely apply to the seizing of mortgages. Finally, Section Five
will focus on the predicted effect this proposal, if enacted, would have
on lenders and borrowers, proving that San Bernardino should refrain
from using eminent domain to seize private mortgages.
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Univeristy of Richmond; B.A. 2008, University of Virginia.
1 Sam Forgione, FHFA Raises Concerns About Eminent Domain Plan, REUTERS
(Aug. 8, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/08/us-mortgages-
restructuring-idUSBRE8771C420120808.
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II. THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
The mortgage crisis, which began in 2007, has had a crippling
effect on the country’s housing market over the last six years.  As of
January 2012, there were approximately 12 million underwater home-
owners nationwide,2 with sources estimating that they collectively
owed $1.2 trillion more than their homes are worth.3  Moreover, of the
12 million underwater homeowners, approximately 28 percent were
behind on their payments, putting them at a higher risk of default.4
Such defaults typically result in lengthy and expensive short-sale or
foreclosure proceedings5 (totaling upwards of 3.9 million in 20116),
during which both lenders and homeowners suffer.  While refinancing
the loan for lower interest rates is an option for some, many homeown-
ers owe as much as twice what their house is currently worth.7  For
those borrowers, a principal modification, a special form of debt relief
offered by the lender, is the only thing that will save their homes.8
So why, in the face of a national financial crisis of this scale, is
it so difficult for homeowners to obtain loan modifications? One of the
biggest problems is that while homebuyers initially sign a mortgage
with a bank or financial service company, most of those firms only ser-
vice, or manage, the loan.9 Many loans are then bought and sold to
investors on the secondary market as mortgage-backed securities.10
Unfortunately, it is where the loans end up, not where they originate,
2 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CUR-
RENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 21 (2012), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.
pdf.
3 Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched By Other
Struggling Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domain mortgages_n_1836710.html.
4 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 2; Ted Gayer, How
Many Borrowers Might Qualify for Principal Reduction Under the Mortgage Settle-
ment?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/up-front/posts/2012/03/01-mortgage-agreement-gayer.
5 Estimates from 2008 suggest that a foreclosure costs approximately $77,000, a
cost that is split between the lender, homeowner, neighborhood, and local govern-
ment. Glenn Setzer, Foreclosures Cost Lenders, Homeowners, the Community Big
Bucks, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY, (June 2, 2008), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.
com/622008_Foreclosure_Costs.asp.
6 Home Foreclosure Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.statis-
ticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/.
7 Hallman, supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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that matters for the homebuyers seeking to qualify for principal
reduction.11
Underwater homeowners with loans at the largest banks are
currently receiving the most assistance. Five banks, including Bank of
America and JPMorgan Chase, reached a settlement agreement with
state attorney generals in early 2012 to offer debt forgiveness of at
least $10 billion.12  While it is questionable whether this assistance
will reach a significant number of homeowners,13 the banks must
reach the $10 billion target or face financial penalties.14
The second and largest pool of loans are those owned or con-
trolled by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-owned mortgage
companies. In early 2012, it was estimated that approximately 3.3 mil-
lion of those loans were underwater.15  Unfortunately, those homeown-
ers do not currently qualify for any type of principal reduction.16
Private investors, including pension funds like California Pub-
lic Employees’ Retirement System and the bond fund Pacific Invest-
ment Management Co., own much of the remaining approximately ten
percent of all loans.17 These mortgages are the most likely to be deep
underwater (three times as likely as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
loans), and are thus at the highest risk of failing.18  The banks manag-
ing these loans typically point to their contracts with private investors
as the barrier to principal reduction.19 Their loans are often divided
into bonds that are owned by many different investors, so there are
usually no single entities that the banks can approach for revisions of
the agreements.20 Thus, millions of upside down homeowners are un-
likely to see any relief in the form of principal reduction from their
lenders.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN PROPOSAL
When MRP, a self-described community advisory firm,21 for-
mulated its theory that the power of eminent domain could revitalize
the housing market, San Bernardino County seemed like the perfect
11 Id.
12 Id.; Gayer, supra note 4.
13 See Gayer, supra note 4.
14 Hallman, supra note 3.
15 Gayer, supra note 4.
16 Hallman, supra note 3.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/ (last visited Dec.
2012).
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place to test the concept.  The recession had hit San Bernardino’s
homeowners harder than most.  In late 2012, the County’s 11.9 per-
cent unemployment rate was one of the nation’s highest,22 and hous-
ing prices had plummeted as a result.  Unsurprisingly, every second
homeowner in San Bernardino was underwater by the summer of
2012.23
MRP sought out the county CEO, Greg Devereaux, and
presented its CARES theory (Community Action to Restore Equity and
Stability24) to use eminent domain to help county homeowners.25 Emi-
nent domain is the authority of the government “to take private prop-
erty for a public use” so long as the owner receives “just compensation”
for the property taken.26 This authority is available to the federal gov-
ernment under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.27 Every
state government has also inherently been granted this authority as
an attribute of sovereignty, subject to limitations found in each state’s
constitution or statutory law.28 Eminent domain is, in theory, applica-
ble to any type of property, including mortgages.
22  GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA EXPLORER, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds
=z1ebjpgk2654c1_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=unemploy-
ment_rate&fdim_y=seasonality:U&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim
=county:CN060710&iifdi=country&tstart=631861200000&tend=1336536000000&
hl=en&dl=en&ind=false&q=san+bernardino+county+unnemployment+rate#!c
type=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=unemployment_rate&fdim_y=
seasonality:U&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=county:CN060710
&ifdim=country&tstart=1290747600000&tend=1359176400000&hl=en_US&dl=
en&ind=false (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
23 Realtors, Banks Warn Plan To Seize Distressed Homes May Backfire: Half of
San Bernardino County Homeowners ‘Underwater’, CBS LOS ANGELES (July 6,
2012, 8:31 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2012/07/06/realtors-banks-warn-
plan-to-seize-distressed-homes-may-backfire/.
24 MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS, supra note 21.
25 Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Housing’s Last Chance?, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2012 at A21,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/opinion/nocera-housings-last-
chance.html?_r=0.
26 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (noting that the
Fifth Amendment allows the government to take private property for a “ ‘public
use’ and upon payment of ‘just compensation”’); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1004-05 (1984) (distinguishing between a taking when the government
“deprive[s] the owner of all or most of his interest in a subject matter” and mere
“regulation,” not requiring just compensation).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28 Gober v. Stubbs, 682 So. 2d 430, 433 (Ala. 1996) (explaining that “[t]he power of
eminent domain does not originate in [the constitution, i]nstead, it is a power in-
herent in every sovereign state”); see also Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller,
859 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ariz. 1993); Mt. San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Super. Ct.,
11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 465, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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In this case, the idea is that a municipality could buy underwa-
ter mortgages using its power of eminent domain and then write the
homeowner a new, reduced mortgage.29 Proponents argue it would be
an effective avenue to get around the roadblock of securitization con-
tracts that prevent people from modifying loans.30 MRP maintains
that it could be a way to prevent future foreclosures.31 Ultimately, the
goal would be a stabilization of housing prices.32
The plan calls for the county to buy mortgages at a large, but
fair, discount to their face value,33 and then offer to refinance the
homeowner into a new mortgage with a “sustainable” balance.34 The
plan would take associated fees and costs out of the spread.35 The
money to buy the mortgages would come from investors whom MRP
has already started to secure.36
In addition to San Bernardino, about a dozen other communi-
ties have voiced some level of interest in the eminent domain plan,
including Chicago, Sacramento, New York’s Suffolk County, and
Detroit.37
IV. LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE?
In order for the use of eminent domain to be legal under the
U.S. Constitution and the majority of state constitutions, the govern-
ment must take the property for a “public use” and the owner must
receive “just compensation” for the acquired property.38 Since San Ber-
nardino would be offering a fair price for the property, the more fre-
quent objection to MRP’s plan is that the taking of private mortgages
would not be a legitimate public use, in violation of the U.S. and most
state constitutions. In fact, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(“FHFA”) launched a formal investigation into the proposal in late
2012, issuing a request for input from industry groups.39 In an open
letter to the FHFA, the California Association of Realtors expressed its
apprehension at the idea, stating:
29 Nocera, supra note 25; MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note  21.
30 Nocera, supra note 25.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 MORTGAGE RESOL. PARTNERS, supra note 21.
35 Nocera, supra note 25.
36 Id.
37 Hallman, supra note 3.
38 See, e.g, Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-05 (1984).
39 Notice of Input Accepted on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing
Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 154 (Aug. 9, 2012), available at  http://fhfa.gov/webfiles/24147/
77_FR_47652_8-9-12.pdf.
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While we applaud local officials’ efforts to continually
search for innovative solutions to expedite a full eco-
nomic recovery, we cannot support this proposal . . . The
use of eminent domain to seize underwater performing
loans, alter their loan terms, and then resell them to an-
other investor is . . . a violation of the “public use” re-
quirement of eminent domain.40
However, the critics of MRP’s plan are unlikely to find much
support for their challenge under either the federal or state law.  The
definition of what constitutes a valid public use has been greatly ex-
panded by the majority of both state and federal courts over the years
so that, now, almost any acquisition will satisfy the test.
A. Federal Law
As early as 1954, the United States Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether a taking that involves sale to a private party could
fulfill the requirement for legitimate public purpose under the U.S.
Constitution.  In Berman v. Parker, the Court held that Washington
D.C.’s use of eminent domain for the public use of acquiring commer-
cial property was constitutional.41 The Court found that the taking of
property for slum clearance and the removal of urban blight was a le-
gitimate public purpose within the police powers of the state.42 The
Court based its decision on an expanded definition of public use that
allows private enterprises to be involved in the taking of private prop-
erty for its redevelopment and resale.43 To elaborate on this point, the
Court stated that:
[T]he means of executing the project are for Congress
and Congress alone to determine, once the public pur-
pose has been established. The public end may be as well
or better served through an agency of private enterprise
than through a department of government—or so the
Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public
40 Open Letter from Arnold LeFrancis, President, California Association of Real-
tors, to Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel, FHFA on the Use of Eminent Domain
to Restructure Performing Loans (Sept. 7, 2012) (on file with the FHFA), available
at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24290/16_California_Association_of_REALTORS.
pdf.
41 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
42 Id. at 32.
43 Id. at 33 (noting that the public welfare may include “spiritual . . . physical,
aesthetic . . . and monetary” values).
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ownership is the sole method of promoting the public
purposes of community redevelopment projects.44
As a result, an early standard was set for allowing private party in-
volvement in valid eminent domain takings under the U.S.
Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court again opted for a broad definition of
public use in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.45 At issue in this
case was the constitutionality of Hawaii’s Land Reform Act, which
aimed to reduce the social and economic evils caused by large land es-
tates that dated back to the high chiefs of the pre-statehood Hawaiian
Islands.46 To reduce the concentration of inland ownership, the Act
created the Hawaii Housing Authority, whose mission was to take title
to the real property from lessors of large land estates, condemn the
land, then sell the property to the lessees inhabiting the land at the
time that it was condemned.47 Lessees could file to have the land they
lived on condemned, but the process would only be instituted once the
Authority determined through a public hearing that the “acquisition of
the tract would promote the public purposes of the Act.”48
In Midkiff, lessors who had refused to comply with the Author-
ity’s condemnation process had filed suit in federal court claiming that
the Act was unconstitutional.49 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a “literal requirement” of general public use of property is
not necessary to meet the conditions of eminent domain.50 Thus, the
Court disagreed with a lower court decision that the government must
possess and use the property at some point during the condemnation
process.51 Justice O’Connor, writing for the unanimous Court stated
that:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent
domain is transferred in the first instance to private ben-
eficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a
private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for
44 Id. at 33-34; David Schultz, Economic Development and Eminent Domain After
Kelo: Property Rights and “Public Use” Under State Constitutions, 11 ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 41, 47 (2006).
45 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
46 HAW. REV. STAT. § 516.1-516.56 (1993) (granting the housing finance and devel-
opment corporation the power to use eminent domain or purchase land with the
threat of eminent domain); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232-33; Schultz, supra note 44, at
48.
47 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233-34.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 234-35.
50 Id. at 244.
51 Id. at 243.
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the general public. “It is not essential that the entire
community, nor even any considerable portion . . . di-
rectly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order
[for it] to constitute a public use .” . . . “[W]hat in its im-
mediate aspect [is] only a private transaction may . . . be
raised by its class or character to a public affair.”52
Thus, in Midkiff, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the use of
eminent domain for redistribution of private resources within a com-
munity if it accomplishes a widely drawn public purpose.53
As recently as 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet again
ruled in favor of an expanded interpretation of public use, this time
expanding it to economic development. In Kelo v. City of New London,
the Court affirmed a Connecticut Supreme Court decision that held
the taking of unblighted private property with the goal of economic
development constituted a valid public use under both the state and
federal constitutions.54
In this case, the City of New London, a municipal corporation,
and the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit en-
tity, planned to use the authority granted to them under a state law55
to take unblighted land in the waterfront area known as Fort
Trumbell to build a residential and commercial development in an ef-
fort to revitalize the city’s downtown area.56 The development plan
was divided into seven parcels, with most of the parcels planned for
use in projects such as waterfront walkways or museums.57 However,
one parcel, known as Lot 3, was designated for sale to Pfizer Pharma-
ceutical Company for construction of a $300 million research and de-
velopment office complex and parking facility.58
Nine owners of Fort Trumball homes, four of which were lo-
cated in Lot 3, brought suit, claiming that the taking of their un-
blighted land for economic development purposes was in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.59 They contended that using eminent domain
for economic development “impermissibly blurs the boundary between
public and private takings.”60 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
52 Id. at 243-44 (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923);
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 153 (1921)); Schultz, supra note 44, at 50.
53 Schultz, supra note 44, at 50.
54 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005); Schultz, supra note 44, at
59.
55 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-188, 8-193 (2005)).
56 Id. at 474; Schultz, supra note 44, at 59.
57 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474; Schultz, supra note 44, at 59.
58 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-74. See generally Schultz, supra note 44, at 59.
59 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
60 Id. at 485.
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rari to the federal question of whether a city’s decision to take private
property for economic development purposes, when it involved the
transfer of land from one private owner to another, satisfied the public
use requirement under the Fifth Amendment.61
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking was not a violation of
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.62 The Court rea-
soned that it was not a private taking because the decision to acquire
the property was part of a “ ‘carefully considered’ development plan”
and there was no motive by the county to convey a private benefit on a
“particular class of identifiable individuals.”63
Additionally, the Court rejected the homeowners’ argument
that the plan did not satisfy the public use requirement because the
property was going to be sold to and used by a private party.64 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that “this ‘Court long ago re-
jected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into
use for the general public,’”65 and, instead, this narrow reading of pub-
lic use had been rejected in favor of a broader “public purpose” reading
of the public use doctrine.66 The main issue then became whether the
seizure of Lot 3 served a valid public purpose,67 and the court looked to
the precedent in Berman68 and Midkiff,69 both of which deferred to
legislative determinations of what is considered a public purpose.
Thus, since the City of New London had acted within its state statu-
tory power in using eminent domain, the Kelo court held that the tak-
ing of private property for economic development purposes was a valid
public use under the Fifth Amendment.70
B. State Law
Several state supreme courts have also ruled in favor of a
broad interpretation of public use in their own state constitutions.  In
the early 1980s, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council v. City of Detroit, upheld the City of Detroit’s use of its
eminent domain authority to level an entire neighborhood, relocate
over 1300 households, and acquire over 150 private businesses to
61 Id. at 477; Schultz, supra note 44, at 60.
62 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
63 Id. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004));
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Schultz, supra note 44, at
60.
64 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478-80; Schultz, supra note 44, at 60-61.
65 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
66 Id. at 479-80; Schultz, supra note 44, at 60-61.
67 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
68 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954); Schultz, supra note 44, at 61.
69 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229; Schultz, supra note 44, at 61.
70 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489-90.
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make room for a General Motors assembly plant.71 The City exercised
its eminent domain authority pursuant to the Michigan Economic De-
velopment Corporations Act.72 A neighborhood association and several
residents of the Poletown area, including the owners of ten non-
blighted businesses, opposed the taking because the land would be
sold to GM.73  They brought suit, challenging the taking as not consti-
tuting a valid public use under the Michigan Constitution because the
land would be immediately transferred to a private party.74 The re-
sidents also claimed that there was a difference between what consti-
tuted a valid “public use” under the Michigan Constitution versus
what was a public purpose.75  The City, however, contended that the
proposed condemnation was for a valid public use because it would
benefit the public by alleviating and preventing unemployment and
“fiscal distress.”76 Thus, the court faced the issue of whether the Mich-
igan Constitution recognized a narrow or broader conception of public
use.77
The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the taking as a valid pub-
lic use under the state constitution, contending that the public would
be the primary beneficiary and the private benefit was merely inciden-
tal.78 It reasoned that the needs served by this use of eminent domain
included providing an economic boost and supporting the revitaliza-
tion of local industry.79  As a result, the Court said that it could not
narrow the definition of public use, pointing to Court precedent that
“public use changes with changing conditions of society . . . [and] [t]he
right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use deter-
mines whether the use is public or private.”80
71 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich.
2004); Schultz, supra note 44, at 51.
72 Economic Corporations Development Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.1602 (2001)
(“There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and pre-
vent conditions of unemployment . . . it is accordingly necessary to assist and re-
tain local industrial and commercial enterprises, including employee-owned
corporations, to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and its munici-
palities . . . .Therefore, the powers granted in this act constitute the performance
of essential public purposes and functions for this state and its municipalities.”);
Schultz, supra note 44, at 51-52.
73 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457; Schultz, supra note 44, at 52.
74 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
75 Id. at 457; Schultz, supra note 44, at 52.
76 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
77 Schultz, supra note 44, at 52-53.
78 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 475 (quoting Hays v. City of Kalamazoo, 25 N.W.2d 787, 790 (1947)).
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The Court also set an unmatched, and widely criticized, prece-
dent for a state court defining the judiciary’s role in the determination
of what qualifies as public use under the state constitution.81 Quoting
state precedent and Berman v. Parker, the Court held that “ ‘[t]he de-
termination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legisla-
tive function’”82 and a determination made by the legislature
regarding a public interest is “well-nigh conclusive.”83 Thus, Poletown
became an unprecedented expansion of eminent domain power and
government control over private property.84
The next year the California Supreme Court upheld the right
of a municipality to use the eminent domain power under the Califor-
nia constitution to acquire the property rights, including “intangible
contractual rights,” of a sports franchise contemplating relocation in
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders.85  In this case, the City used its
eminent domain power to seize all of the business assets of the Oak-
land Raiders’ football franchise.86 The team owners had been leasing
their stadium from a public nonprofit for fifteen years and, when nego-
tiations to renew the lease failed, the team announced its intention to
relocate to Los Angeles.87 The City then commenced an eminent do-
main action to acquire the team’s property rights,88 “including players’
contracts, team equipment, and television and radio contracts.”89 In
response, the franchise owners brought suit on two grounds: (1) that
eminent domain could not be used to take “intangible property not as-
sociated with realty;”90 and (2) that the “taking contemplated by the
City cannot, as a matter of law, be for any ‘public use’ within [the]
City’s authority.”91
The Court first faced the issue of whether the City had the
power to acquire intangible property to serve municipal uses.92 It
noted that “in contrast to the broad powers of general government . . .
a municipal corporation has no inherent power of eminent domain and
can exercise it only when expressly authorized by law.”93 However,
81 Schultz, supra note 44, at 54.
82 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting Gregory Marina, Inc. v. City of Detroit,
144 N.W.2d 503, 516 (1966)).
83 Id. at 633 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
84 Schultz, supra note 44, at 54.
85 City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
86 Id. at 837.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Schultz, supra note 44, at 55.
90 Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 837; Schultz, supra note 44, at 55.
91 Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 837.
92 Schultz, supra note 44, at 56.
93 Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 838.
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California’s eminent domain statutes provided that “a city may ac-
quire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of its
powers or functions” (emphasis added).94 Thus, the Court found that
the City of Oakland did have the power to acquire the Oakland’s Raid-
ers property, establishing the precedent that “intangible assets are
subject to condemnation” under eminent domain.95
The Court then focused on whether the City’s actions were
within the state constitutional requirement that eminent domain ac-
quisitions serve a “public use.”96 It defined public use as “a use which
concerns the whole community or promotes the general interest in its
relation to any legitimate object of government.”97 However, the Court
also noted state precedent, asserting that “[i]t is not essential that the
entire community, or even a considerable portion thereof, shall directly
enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a public
use.”98 The City argued that the acquisition of the assets served a pub-
lic use because of “the factual circumstances surrounding the construc-
tion of the Oakland Coliseum and the integration of the past use of the
stadium with the life of the City of Oakland in general.”99 In consider-
ing the City’s argument for its untraditional use of eminent domain,
the Court noted the broad common law application of public use and
its evolving nature in California.100  Thus, the Court held that the “ac-
quisition, and . . . operation of a sports franchise may be an appropri-
ate municipal function.”101 The City met the public use requirement
because the community as a whole could benefit economically and cul-
turally from the acquisition.102
However, not all state courts have agreed with a broad inter-
pretation of public use.  In the recent landmark case of County of
Wayne v. Hathcock,103 the Michigan Supreme Court held that a more
narrow construction of public use was necessary under the Michigan
State Constitution.104  At issue in Hathcock was a plan by Wayne
County to condemn several parcels of private property near the Metro-
94 Id. at 838 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 37350.5 (West 1975)).
95 Id. at 840, 843; Schultz, supra note 44, at 56.
96 Schultz, supra note 44, at 55.
97 Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 841 (quoting Bauer v. County of Ventura, 289
P.2d 1 (1955)).
98 Id. at 841.
99 Id. at 844; Schultz, supra note 44, at 57.
100 Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 842 (noting that the commission revising Cali-
fornia’s eminent domain laws had specifically recommended against the retention
of the list of possible public uses in the new law).
101 Id. at 843; Schultz, supra note 44, at 55.
102 Schultz, supra note 44, at 56.
103 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).
104 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 780; Schultz, supra note 44, at 73.
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politan Airport.105 As part of the expansion of the airport and the con-
struction of a nearby business and technology park, the County sought
to obtain several properties that would be subject to increased noise
and traffic.106 When the owners of nineteen parcels refused to sell, the
county initiated condemnation proceedings under Michigan’s Uniform
Condemnation Procedures Act.107  The owners then brought a claim in
Michigan state court, contending that the condemnation violated both
Michigan Compiled Laws section 213.23, and Article 10, Section 2 of
the Michigan Constitution.108
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that ”the taking
of property from one private owner and transferring it to another pri-
vate owner to encourage economic development or alleviate unemploy-
ment was not a valid public use under . . . the Michigan
Constitution.”109  The Court stated that transfer of condemned private
property from one owner to another private owner was only permitted
in three situations.110  First, it recognized condemnations in which pri-
vate land was constitutionally transferred by the condemning author-
ity to a private entity that involved “public necessity of the extreme
sort otherwise impracticable.”111 The second circumstance was when
the private entity remains accountable to the public in its use of that
property.112  Lastly, condemned land could be transferred to a private
entity when the selection of the land to be condemned is itself based on
“facts of independent public significance.”113  By narrowing the public
use definition in this manner, the Court also overruled Poletown,114
invalidating a major legal precedent cited in many jurisdictions to sup-
port the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes.115
Opponents of the San Bernardino proposal have cited similar
concerns to the court in Hathcock with regards to municipalities seiz-
105 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 769.
106 Id. at 769-70.
107 Id. at 771.
108 Id.
109 Schultz, supra note 44, at 73-74.
110 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 773.
111 Id. at 781.
112 Id. at 782.
113 Id. at 782-83.
114 Id. at 786 (“To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the
fact that the use of that property by a private entity seeking its own profit might
contribute to the economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limita-
tions on . . . eminent domain.  Poletown’s ‘economic benefit’ rationale would vali-
date practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private
entity.”).
115 Schultz, supra note 44, at 75.
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ing private loans and selling them to another private party.116  While
those opponents may have Hathcock precedent on their side in ques-
tioning the constitutionality of the proposal, the overwhelming major-
ity of both federal and state courts have agreed that a broad
interpretation of public use is constitutional.  Futhermore, Hathcock
applied only to the Michigan State Constitution, and, while it did over-
rule the existing precedent of broad interpretation in that state,
Poletown had already been recognized by many as an overzealous ex-
pansion of eminent domain power.117
Kelo, Midkiff, Berman, and other federal court decisions,118 on
the other hand, illustrate the wide-ranging interpretation now given to
the public use requirement on the federal level.119 As the court in Kelo
pointed out, it no longer matters if property is taken from one private
party and given to another, as long as there is no motive for private
benefit.120 These courts have also all suggested that the judiciary
should have a limited role in questioning the advisability of eminent
domain decisions by legislatures.121 Though these decisions have not
been without their critics,122 if the proposal was challenged in federal
court, a court would be likely to follow precedent and rule in favor of
San Bernardino County. The County could easily argue that the tak-
ing of mortgages is intended to bestow an economic benefit on the citi-
zens of San Bernardino by lowering the foreclosure rates.
Furthermore, the analogous facts in the Oakland Raiders case
demonstrate that a mortgage taking under eminent domain would
probably not be in violation of the California Constitution. The seizure
of business assets, despite their intangible quality, was found to be
116 California Association of Realtors Letter, supra note 40.
117 See generally Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council v. Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 661-65 (2005) (summariz-
ing numerous criticisms of the Poletown decision).
118 See, e.g., People of Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316, 325 (1st Cir.
1946) (upholding an agrarian reform measure that broke up large tracts of land
and redistributed it into smaller parcels to private individuals); Schultz, supra
note 44, at 50.
119 Schultz, supra note 44, at 50.
120 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-79 (2005).
121 Id. at 482-83.
122 See Kristi M. Burkard, No More Government Theft of Property! A Call to Re-
turn to A Heightened Standard of Review After the United States Supreme Court
Decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115 (2005)
(reasons that the Kelo Court misconstrued the public use requirement under the
Fifth Amendment and wrongly applied the legislative deference standard of judi-
cial review to disputes over fundamental private property rights when it requires
a strict scrutiny standard of review.).
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valid in Oakland Raiders,123 so seizing securitized mortgages, which
are tangible, would likely be considered lawful in this case as well.
Additionally, the Oakland Raiders court ruled that public use is a “use
which concerns the whole community or promotes the general inter-
est.”124  So, even though the entire county of San Bernardino may not
be under water on their mortgages, a large percentage are, and it
would benefit the general interest (i.e. the home values) of the entire
community to have less foreclosures.125  Thus, a California court
would almost certainly find in favor of the County on the state consti-
tutionality of its use of eminent domain.
V. EFFECT ON BORROWERS AND LENDERS
Constitutional implications aside, the proposal also has its fair
share of critics in the mortgage industry.  Those opponents to the pro-
posal predict that, not only will it not result in a market revitalization,
it may actually have a negative effect on the housing market going
forward.  Many argue that this type of debt relief for a select group of
borrowers would threaten the relationship between borrowers and
lenders.126  They believe other borrowers who were making their pay-
ments on time may find defaulting to be a more attractive option if
they can have the principal of their loan reduced.127
Other industry specialists have argued that the use of eminent
domain in this situation could result in reduced access to credit for
borrowers.  The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa-
tion (“SIFMA”) issued a statement to that effect, writing, “We believe
using eminent domain would reduce access to credit for borrowers and
123 City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 843 (Cal. 1982).
124 Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d at 841 (quoting Bauer v. County of Ventura, 289
P.2d 1, 1).
125 See generally Mary Ellen Podmolik, A New Take on Impact of Foreclosures on
Home Values, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 23, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2012-08-23/classified/ct-mre-0826-podmolik-homefront-20120824_1_dis-
tressed-home-home-values-distressed-property (discussing the adverse effect that
numerous homes in foreclosure can have on neighboring property values); Daniel
Hartley, The Impact of Foreclosures on the Housing Market, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF CLEVELAND (Oct. 27, 2010) http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/com-
mentary/2010/2010-15.cfm (noting that foreclosed properties add to the supply of
homes on the market and diminish the desirability of a neighborhood resulting in
lower property values).
126 Hallman, supra note 3.
127 “Edward DeMarco, the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency,
has said that giving debt relief to some borrowers would threaten the covenant
between borrowers and lenders, and encourage those making their payments on
time to default and cash in.” Id.
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would, at a minimum, result in lengthy and costly litigation.”128 The
FHFA has echoed those concerns, stating that it “has significant con-
cerns with programs that could undermine and have a chilling effect
on the extension of credit to borrowers seeking to become homeowners
and on investors that support the housing market.”129
Mortgage investment groups also believe that San Bernar-
dino’s use of eminent domain could have an adverse effect.130  Invest-
ment analysts have predicted that this type of precedent could push
national mortgage interest rates up as much as 10 percent.131  There is
also concern that the ability of the government to seize underwater
mortgages means that mortgage investors would view new loans as
only partially secured,132 creating a domino effect on the rest of the
mortgage industry.
Thus, while an end to the housing crisis would be a welcome
relief for many, the MRP proposal would likely only exacerbate the
problem by deepening the rift between lenders and borrowers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the San Bernardino proposal would likely be up-
held by courts as a valid use of the power afforded to municipalities by
the Fifth Amendment and state constitutions, because it serves a legit-
imate public purpose through its potential to economically benefit over
half of the County’s homeowners.  In spite of this, the long-term risks
of the plan may prevent it from ever getting off the ground.  Experts on
both sides of the issue can see that government interference may have
a negative effect on the lending market, and that the risks likely out-
weigh the possible benefits133 of immediate relief for San Bernardino.
Thus, the San Bernardino proposal would simply be applying a band-
aid to a broken bone - providing no lasting solution to the housing
crisis.
128 Id.
129 Notice of Input Accepted on Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Perform-
ing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 154 (Aug.  9, 2012), available at http://fhfa.gov/webfiles/
24147/77_FR_47652_8-9-12.pdf.
130 “ ‘We think it’s a disastrous idea and would be a horrible precedent for the
market,’ Stephen Walsh, [said] chief investment officer of Western Asset Manage-
ment Co. . . . ‘What might bring isolated benefit to a particular city across the
board could be very negative for housing financing going forward in the United
States,’ he said.” Forgione, supra note 1.
131 Hallman, supra note 3.
132 Id. (quoting Edwin Groshans, analyst at investment advisory group Height
Analytics).
133 Forgione, supra note 1 (quoting Edward DeMarco, acting director of the
FHFA).
